Initial commit: AirCoding V1.0.0 Alpha architecture baseline
Complete architecture document set with multi-model review remediation: - Frozen interface contracts, runtime semantics, DB schemas - Event/tool/error/provider registries - Scheduler and main agent state machines - C4 module/code views, solution architecture, baseline V1 - Multi-model review reports and joint assessment - Phase-gate remediation complete (P0/P1/P2/UX resolved) - Implementation plan with T-000A through T-045 - Reference folders kept as placeholders only
This commit is contained in:
AirCoding
205
reference/hermes-agent-2026.5.16/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml
vendored
Executable file
205
reference/hermes-agent-2026.5.16/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml
vendored
Executable file
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
|
||||
name: Supply Chain Audit
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
|
||||
paths:
|
||||
- '**/*.py'
|
||||
- '**/*.pth'
|
||||
- '**/setup.py'
|
||||
- '**/setup.cfg'
|
||||
- '**/sitecustomize.py'
|
||||
- '**/usercustomize.py'
|
||||
- '**/__init__.pth'
|
||||
- 'pyproject.toml'
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
pull-requests: write
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
# Narrow, high-signal scanner. Only fires on critical indicators of supply
|
||||
# chain attacks (e.g. the litellm-style payloads). Low-signal heuristics
|
||||
# (plain base64, plain exec/eval, dependency/Dockerfile/workflow edits,
|
||||
# Actions version unpinning, outbound POST/PUT) were intentionally
|
||||
# removed — they fired on nearly every PR and trained reviewers to ignore
|
||||
# the scanner. Keep this file's checks ruthlessly narrow: if you find
|
||||
# yourself adding WARNING-tier patterns here again, make a separate
|
||||
# advisory-only workflow instead.
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
scan:
|
||||
name: Scan PR for critical supply chain risks
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Scan diff for critical patterns
|
||||
id: scan
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
|
||||
HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Added lines only, excluding lockfiles.
|
||||
DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)
|
||||
|
||||
FINDINGS=""
|
||||
|
||||
# --- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup) ---
|
||||
# The exact mechanism used in the litellm supply chain attack:
|
||||
# https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512
|
||||
PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$PTH_FILES" ]; then
|
||||
FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
|
||||
### 🚨 CRITICAL: .pth file added or modified
|
||||
Python \`.pth\` files in \`site-packages/\` execute automatically when the interpreter starts — no import required.
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:**
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
${PTH_FILES}
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- base64 decode + exec/eval on the same line (the litellm attack pattern) ---
|
||||
B64_EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|decodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)' | grep -iE 'exec\(|eval\(' | head -10 || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$B64_EXEC_HITS" ]; then
|
||||
FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
|
||||
### 🚨 CRITICAL: base64 decode + exec/eval combo
|
||||
Base64-decoded strings passed directly to exec/eval — the signature of hidden credential-stealing payloads.
|
||||
|
||||
**Matches:**
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
${B64_EXEC_HITS}
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command argument ---
|
||||
PROC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -E 'subprocess\.(Popen|call|run)\s*\(' | grep -iE 'base64|\\x[0-9a-f]{2}|chr\(' | head -10 || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$PROC_HITS" ]; then
|
||||
FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
|
||||
### 🚨 CRITICAL: subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command
|
||||
Subprocess calls whose command strings are base64- or hex-encoded are a strong indicator of payload execution.
|
||||
|
||||
**Matches:**
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
${PROC_HITS}
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Install-hook files (setup.py/sitecustomize/usercustomize/__init__.pth) ---
|
||||
# These execute during pip install or interpreter startup.
|
||||
SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '(^|/)(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py|__init__\.pth)$' || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$SETUP_HITS" ]; then
|
||||
FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
|
||||
### 🚨 CRITICAL: Install-hook file added or modified
|
||||
These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:**
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
${SETUP_HITS}
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$FINDINGS" ]; then
|
||||
echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "$FINDINGS" > /tmp/findings.md
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Post critical finding comment
|
||||
if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
BODY="## 🚨 CRITICAL Supply Chain Risk Detected
|
||||
|
||||
This PR contains a pattern that has been used in real supply chain attacks. A maintainer must review the flagged code carefully before merging.
|
||||
|
||||
$(cat /tmp/findings.md)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
*Scanner only fires on high-signal indicators: .pth files, base64+exec/eval combos, subprocess with encoded commands, or install-hook files. Low-signal warnings were removed intentionally — if you're seeing this comment, the finding is worth inspecting.*"
|
||||
|
||||
gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs — GITHUB_TOKEN is read-only)"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Fail on critical findings
|
||||
if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "::error::CRITICAL supply chain risk patterns detected in this PR. See the PR comment for details."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
|
||||
dep-bounds:
|
||||
name: Check PyPI dependency upper bounds
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
if: contains(github.event.pull_request.changed_files_url, 'pyproject.toml') || true
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Check for unbounded PyPI deps
|
||||
id: bounds
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
|
||||
HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Only check added lines in pyproject.toml
|
||||
ADDED=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- pyproject.toml | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$ADDED" ]; then
|
||||
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Match PyPI dep specs that have >= but no < ceiling.
|
||||
# Pattern: "package>=version" without a following ",<" bound.
|
||||
# Excludes git+ URLs (which use commit SHAs) and comments.
|
||||
UNBOUNDED=$(echo "$ADDED" | grep -oE '"[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+(\[[^\]]*\])?>=[ 0-9.]+"' | grep -v ',<' || true)
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$UNBOUNDED" ]; then
|
||||
echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "$UNBOUNDED" > /tmp/unbounded.txt
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Post unbounded dep warning
|
||||
if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
BODY="## ⚠️ Unbounded PyPI Dependency Detected
|
||||
|
||||
This PR adds PyPI dependencies without a \`<next_major\` upper bound. Per our [supply chain policy](../blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependency-pinning-policy-supply-chain-hardening), all PyPI deps must be pinned as \`>=floor,<next_major\`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Unbounded specs found:**
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
$(cat /tmp/unbounded.txt)
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix:** Add an upper bound, e.g. \`\"package>=1.2.0,<2\"\`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
*See PR #2810 and CONTRIBUTING.md for the full policy rationale.*"
|
||||
|
||||
gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs)"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Fail on unbounded deps
|
||||
if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "::error::PyPI dependencies without upper bounds detected. Add <next_major ceiling per CONTRIBUTING.md policy."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user